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DEFENDERS OF SMALL BUSINESS?:
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUPREME COURT’S
RECENT TRADEMARK JURISPRUDENCE
Sharon K. Sandeen†
In his article The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New
Millennium, Professor Welkowitz cogently demonstrates that the
United States Supreme Court has taken a renewed interest in the
subject of trademark law and apparently is intent on limiting its
1
scope. This conclusion is, however, only part of the analysis
required to understand the Court’s recent trademark
jurisprudence and predict its future development. As Professor
Welkowitz suggests throughout his article, the more interesting
question is this: Why has the Court recently acted to limit the scope
of trademark law when, during the same period of time, it has
declined the invitation to impose significant limitations on the
2
scope of patent and copyright law?
† Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, St. Paul,
Minnesota; LL.M., U.C. Berkeley, Boalt Hall School of Law; J.D., University of the
Pacific, McGeorge School of Law; B.A., U.C. Berkeley.
1. David S. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law in the New
Millennium, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1659 (2004).
I reached a similar conclusion shortly after the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Wal-Mart based on a chance encounter with Associate Justice Anthony
Kennedy at a luncheon in Sacramento, California. Since Justice (then Judge)
Kennedy was one of my law professors, he recognized me and asked me what kind
of work I was doing. I told him I was teaching intellectual property law and
trademark law and that I had recently read Wal-Mart. His eyes seemed to light up
and he asked me what I thought of the opinion. After a brief discussion during
which I told him I thought the opinion was well-reasoned, I recall being struck by
the fact that Justice Kennedy seemed to be concerned about the proper scope of
trademark law. Because I am a former trademark attorney who had been troubled
for years about the over-assertion of trademark rights and the under-appreciation
of common law trademark principles, the thought that the Supreme Court would
take a greater interest in trademark law was very welcome.
2. The case of New York Times Co., Inc. v. Tasini, Inc., 533 U.S. 483 (2001),
concerned an interpretation of a provision of United States Copyright law that, if
interpreted in the manner suggested by the New York Times, would have
narrowed the practical scope of the copyrights enjoyed by freelance authors. The
court ruled in favor of the freelance authors. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
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The four “new millennium” cases reviewed by Professor
Welkowitz do not contain a direct answer to this question but do
3
provide some plausible clues. As Professor Welkowitz points out,
one possible explanation is that the Supreme Court came to the
rather late realization that lower federal courts had let trademark
4
law drift from its historic roots. Differences in the constitutional
bases of the three doctrines may also explain why certain members
of the Court seem more concerned about the potential
overbreadth and anticompetitive effects of trademark law than
5
about these effects in patent or copyright law.
A related
explanation is that the Court is beginning to appreciate the
6
important doctrinal differences between the three areas of law. As
Professor Welkowitz explains: “Beginning with Wal-Mart, the Court
increasingly has viewed trademark law through the lens of unfair
7
competition, rather than intellectual property.” Unlike patent and
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002), the Court could have narrowed the
practical scope of patent law by accepting the limited view of the doctrine of
equivalents applied by the Federal Circuit, but chose not to do so. In Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003), the Court was asked to rule the Copyright Term
Extension Act unconstitutional on the grounds that it violated both the First
Amendment’s guarantee of free speech and the “limited times” language of
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8. Instead, it interpreted Congress’ power to regulate
copyright broadly and upheld the constitutionality of the Act. Id. at 222.
3. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc. 529 U.S. 205 (2000);
TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 (2003); and Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
4. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1660. See also, Mark A. Lemley, The Modern
Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L. J. 1687, 1688 (1999)
(describing the state of trademark law immediately prior to the new millennium
and lamenting the movement of trademark law away from its “traditional
economic moorings”).
5. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1689 (“Several of the Justices may be
concerned that Congress is beginning to reach the boundaries of its enumerated
powers. Although the Commerce Clause gives Congress broad power to regulate,
the existence of a specific power to regulate intellectual property [identified by
Welkowitz as including only patent and copyright law. See id.], a power that only
allows rights for “limited times,” and that impliedly contains other limitations, may
be viewed as an implicit limit on Congress’s power to expand the scope of
trademark rights.”).
6. See id. at 1687-90.
7. Id. at 1687-88. Perhaps inadvertently, Professor Welkowitz enters the fray
about whether intellectual property is really “property,” by labeling patent and
copyright law as “the real intellectual property doctrines.” Id. at 1678-79. For
details about the debate whether intellectual property is “property,” see Timothy J.
Brennan, Copyright, Property and the Right to Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675 (1993);
Stephen L. Carter, Does It Matter Whether Intellectual Property Is Property?, 68 CHI.KENT L. REV. 715 (1993); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property, 81 TEX. L. REV.
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copyright law, which were specifically designed to protect defined
proprietary interests, trademark law was designed to protect
8
consumers and prevent unfair competition.
In the remainder of this comment, I explore another possible
explanation for the Supreme Court’s renewed interest in
trademark law or, even if it is not, one I hope all courts consider
when they decide trademark cases: the impact that the improper
application of trademark law has on small and fledgling businesses.
If the United States is truly a country that values free competition
and wants to encourage the development of new businesses—many
with new and innovative ideas—it must reduce the barriers to entry
that an expansive view of trademark law erects. While many
businesses innovate and create works of authorship and, therefore,
should be aware of the potential benefits of copyright and patent
law, all businesses need a name and identity. Thus, of the three
intellectual property doctrines (four including trade secret law),
trademark law is the one that is most likely to immediately and
directly affect small businesses and fledging entrepreneurs.
The barriers to entry posed by an expansive view of trademark
law can take several forms. Most simply, when trademark law is
applied too broadly the number of available marks is diminished
and the transaction costs associated with finding an available mark
9
increase. For an unsophisticated entrepreneur who proceeds to
715 (2003); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the
Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); and Lawrence Lessig, The
Architecture of Innovation, 51 DUKE L. J. 1783 (2002). See also 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:14 (4th ed. 2003)
[hereinafter MCCARTHY]. In so doing, I believe that he illuminates the need of
lawyers, courts and many intellectual property scholars to stop focusing so much
on labels and start looking instead at the underlying purpose of the various
intellectual property doctrines.
The problem with the label “intellectual property” is that it inappropriately
conjures up real and personal property concepts that should not be applied to
patent, copyright, trademark or trade secret law by rote. By identifying a dividing
line between patents and copyrights on the one hand and trademarks on the
other, albeit while still using the oft-misunderstood “intellectual property”
moniker, Professor Welkowitz highlights a critical distinction between the
doctrines. Patent and copyright law was designed to encourage innovation and
creativity by protecting the resulting inventions and works of authorship for a
limited time. Trademark law, on the other hand, was not designed to protect a
proprietary right but was designed to prevent unfair competition and protect
consumers. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1678.
8. Welkowitz, supra note 1, at 1678.
9. For a recent account of the consequences of the lack of available names,
see James Glieck, Get Out of My Namespace, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Mar. 21, 2004, at
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open a business unaware of the details of trademark law, the lack of
available marks engenders a greater risk that he will select a name
that is already in use by another company and be forced to change
the name in the early stages of his new business. Upon receipt of a
cease-and-desist letter, the fledging entrepreneur will either hire an
attorney to help resolve the matter or voluntarily change the name
of his business. Because many small-business owners harbor the
view that attorneys are too expensive and tend to identify more
problems than they solve, the name change option is frequently
seen as the least costly alternative. However, even without hiring an
attorney, recourse to the name change option may entail expensive
re-signage and printing costs. It will also entail the loss of whatever
goodwill the new business owner gained during the initial stages of
10
his business.
Moreover, in order to avoid similar claims of
trademark infringement by other companies based on the “new”
name, the business electing to change its name is well-advised to
11
incur costs for a trademark search.
For a sophisticated entrepreneur who prepares a business plan
and understands the potential importance of trademark law to the
future success of his business, the expansive application of
trademark law means that the costs associated with the selection,
clearance, and registration of a mark are heightened. When an
attorney is hired to assist a business in the selection of a trademark,
such costs typically include a preliminary search of online databases
and, if the preliminary search fails to identify a potential conflict,
may include a detailed search conducted by a professional search
12
company. Once a search report is obtained, a business is likely to
spend hundreds of dollars to have the search report analyzed by a
trademark attorney.
If this analysis reveals that a mark is
unavailable—a more likely proposition when trademark principles
are applied broadly—the whole process of selecting a mark and
44.
10. In trademark parlance, “goodwill” refers to the source identifying
function of a mark that, over time, can become stronger and more valuable. 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, §§ 2:15-2:17.
11. See infra notes 14-18 and accompanying text.
12. For more information on the trademark selection and clearance process,
see 1 JAMES E. HAWES & AMANDA V. DWIGHT, TRADEMARK REGISTRATION PRACTICE,
ch. 2 (2003) [hereinafter HAWES & DWIGHT]. The total cost of both a preliminary
and professional search can easily exceed $1000 per proposed mark. Depending
upon the level of complexity, the scope of the search and the required turnaround time, the cost of a professional search by a company like Thomson &
Thomson ranges from $485 to $1920 per mark.
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conducting a trademark search must begin anew.
When a search report indicates that a mark is available for use,
most trademark attorneys recommend that their clients file an
application to register the mark with the United States Patent and
13
Trademark Office. A business that hires a trademark attorney to
assist it to register its marks should expect to spend in excess of
14
$1000 per mark for the service. If a business elects to register a
mark without the aid of an attorney, it will spend at least $335 per
mark, plus the value of the time needed to prepare a trademark
15
application. If a small business chooses not to register its mark, it
can still acquire common law trademark rights based upon the
16
extent of its actual use of the mark. However, the decision to rely
on common law protection may prove costly to the small-business
in the long run if such rights are unappreciated by other
17
companies that wrongly assert they have superior rights. When
these other companies bring a lawsuit and obtain either a
capitulation from the small-business owner or an injunction from a
court, the small business inevitably suffers loss of goodwill and a
costly name change.
13. See 1 HAWES & DWIGHT, supra note 12, §§ 1.7-1.10. The cost to prepare
and file the application, including the filing fee charged by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office, will run anywhere from $500 to multiple thousands
of dollars depending upon a number of factors, including the number of classes in
which registration is sought, whether the application is based on use or an intent
to use, and the nature of the mark.
14. This figure is based upon projected costs for a professional trademark
search of between $300 and $600, the $335 fee currently charged by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (see infra note 15) for filing a trademark
application for a single trademark class, and anticipated professional fees for
attorney or paralegal time of at least $350.
15. This figure represents the current fee, per class, for filing a trademark
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See United States
Patent
and
Trademark
Office,
USPTO
Fees—FY
2004,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/ offices/ac/qs/ope/fee2004apr01.htm (last visited
July 8, 2004).
16. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16:1 and HAWES & DWIGHT, supra note 12,
§ 1.7.
17. Pursuant to principles of United States trademark law, the first or “senior”
user of a mark will prevail over the subsequent or “junior” user of the same or
similar mark even if the junior user registered its mark first. 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 7, §§ 16:4, 16:18.1. Additionally, pursuant to the principle of concurrent use,
it is possible for two or more users of the same or similar marks to acquire
common law rights in such marks and use them concurrently without infringing
the rights of others provided that such usage is in geographically remote
territories. 4 MCCARTHY, surpa note 7, § 26:2 (explaining the “Tea Rose-Rectanus
doctrine” of United States trademark law).
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Given the costs and uncertainty associated with the selection of
a business name, many small businesses, consciously or
unconsciously, adopt a strategy of avoidance. They either proceed
with their choice of business name under the theory that they will
deal with any problems that arise at a later date or they will select a
18
name that is not inherently distinctive. Theoretically, since marks
that are not inherently distinctive are not protectable unless and
until they acquire “secondary meaning,” by selecting a “weak mark”
small-business owners are exposed to less risk of infringing the
19
trademark rights of others.
Additionally, to the extent other
companies have established secondary meaning with respect to
their use of such marks, there is arguably more leeway for new
businesses to use the same or similar marks in conjunction with
20
different goods or services. Obviously, the strategy of selecting a
weak mark in order to avoid potential infringement claims is of
little value if trademark law is applied expansively to provide broad
protection for such marks.
While it is tempting to dismiss the foregoing costs as “the costs
of doing business,” when trademark law is applied too expansively,
such costs not only go up but they also have a greater impact on
18. As Justice Scalia explained, “a mark is inherently distinctive if ‘[its]
intrinsic nature serves to identify a particular source.’ ” See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000). In other words, inherent
distinctiveness is a term of art that focuses attention on the source identifying
function of a mark. If a mark immediately conveys that it represents the source of
goods or services, then it is said to be inherently distinctive. 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 7, §§ 11:2-11:4. If a mark does not immediately convey the source of goods or
services, then it is not inherently distinctive and cannot be protected without proof
that it has acquired distinctiveness. Id.
19. See Kenneth L. Port, The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability, 26 IND. L.
REV. 519, 533 (1993) (explaining the practical significance of weak marks) (“[i]f a
plaintiff must show that its mark has attained secondary meaning because the
plaintiff’s mark is weak, an infringing defendant has a much better success on the
merits.”). See also Brennan’s, Inc. v. Brennan’s Rest., 360 F.3d 125, 132 (2d. Cir.
2004) (denying trademark holder’s motion for preliminary injunction during
pendency of the suit because the holder’s use of a common last name was
inherently weak).
20. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 11:6 (describing the importance of a
“strong” mark and, by implication, the inherent problems of “weak” marks)
(“Being a ‘strong’ mark has significance, in that the mark will then be given an
expansive scope of judicial protection into different product or geographical
markets and as to more variations of format.”). But see 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 7,
§§ 11:79-11:83 (discussing the strong-weak distinction and noting a difference
between conceptual strength [based upon placement of a mark on the trademark
continuum] and market strength [based upon the extent, nature and length of
use of a mark]).
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small businesses. This is because the costs to create, select and
clear proposed marks will constitute a significant proportion of a
21
new entrepreneur’s start-up costs. In contrast to small businesses,
large companies often have the marketing and legal personnel
needed to address the myriad legal issues that trademark law
presents. Even where small businesses have the resources to hire
outside counsel to assist them with their trademark needs, the “gray
areas” that result from an expansive view of trademark law make it
much more time-consuming and difficult for legal counsel to
determine whether a proposed mark can be used without risk of
22
infringement. In fact, the task is often so uncertain that many
lawyers will not give formal legal opinions of non-infringement,
and those who do undoubtedly charge a lot of money for the
23
opinion.
The Supreme Court’s recent trademark cases present a
number of factual scenarios where there is a risk that trademark
law will be misapplied in a way that stifles competition. In WalMart, the Court examined the risks associated with the incorrect
24
application of the principle of inherent distinctiveness. In TrafFix,
the Court considered the question whether trademarks should be
recognized for product features that were once protected by patent
law and the risk that trademark law might be used to protect a
25
product feature that has already entered the public domain.
While Moseley primarily involved the proper interpretation of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, more generally it explored the
21. This point can be easily illustrated with the following hypothetical.
Suppose a small business has anticipated start-up costs of $10,000. If it spends
$1000 for trademark advice and counsel, a full ten percent of its start-up costs are
dedicated to the selection of a trademark. A larger company with a start-up
budget of $1 million, although likely to engage in a more sophisticated trademark
selection process, is unlikely to budget $100,000 for such purpose. Even if such
company expends $10,000 for trademark advice and counsel, such amount is only
one percent of its start-up budget.
22. See 1 HAWES & DWIGHT, supra note 12, § 2.12 (“Evaluating trademark
searches is an art. As with so many other areas of law, there are significant
uncertainties inherent in it.”).
23. While I was in private practice I would give advice to clients about how to
select and protect their trademarks and provide my views on potential
infringement problems, but I would not give a formal opinion of noninfringement. This was due in large part to the American Bar Association
standards on legal opinions. My trademark clients, many of them small-business
owners, were unwilling and unable to pay for the level of due diligence that is
required before a formal opinion can be rendered.
24. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 211-13 (2000).
25. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30-32 (2001).
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circumstances under which the owners of “famous marks” can
successfully enjoin the activities of companies that have, admittedly,
26
not infringed their marks.
The Dastar Court was asked to
27
determine whether the term “origin” as used in the Lanham Act
should be interpreted to mean the original creator of the work or,
28
more narrowly, the manufacturer of the underlying good.
As noted by Professor Welkowitz, the Supreme Court in each
of the foregoing cases expressed concern about the anticompetitive
effects of an expansive interpretation and application of trademark
29
law.
Perhaps the best evidence that the court may want to
position itself as the defender of small business is the reference in
30
Wal-Mart to the “plausible threats of suit against new entrants.”
Clearly, the Supreme Court understands that consumers are
harmed not only by the use of confusingly similar trademarks but
also by the extension of trademark law in a manner that creates
greater barriers to competition. Moreover, Wal-Mart is not just
about the importance of appropriately limiting the scope of
trademark law so it does not unduly stifle competition; it is also
about the consequences of failing to apply a correct conception of
31
the law at the right point in time.
Due to the high costs of
trademark litigation, post-trial is too late in time for most small
businesses to establish that no infringement has occurred. To
26. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433-34 (2003).
27. The “Lanham Act” is the popular name for the federal law governing
trademarks. It was adopted in 1946 and has been subsequently amended on a
number of occasions. See Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427
(codified and amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127, 1141 (2000)).
28. Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 123 S. Ct. 2041 (2003).
29. Welkowitz, The Supreme Court and Trademark Law, supra note 1, at nn.103,
113, 135 and 159, and accompanying text.
30. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000)
(“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of competition with regard to
the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that product design ordinarily serves by a rule
of law that facilitates the plausible threats of suit against new entrants based upon
alleged inherent distinctiveness.”).
Of course, it is ironic to suggest that the Supreme Court has become the defender
of small-business interests when the defendant in the Wal-Mart case was the largest
retailer in the United States. However, the trademark principles that the court
sets down apply to all users of trademarks, large and small. Moreover, if the
subject market in Wal-Mart is defined narrowly as the market for seersucker
dresses, rather than the market for clothing generally, then Wal-Mart can more
easily be seen as a “new entrant.”
31. Id. at 214 (“Competition is deterred, however, not merely by successful
suit but by the plausible threat of successful suit, and the unlikelihood of
inherently source-identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged
inherent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle.”).
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address this concern, Justice Scalia suggests the need for more
32
bright-line tests.
There are several other likely factual scenarios under
trademark law—not yet examined by the Supreme Court in the
new millennium—that can stifle the ability of small-business owners
to compete. The first is where trademark rights are recognized in
marks that are not protectable without proof of secondary
33
meaning. This includes situations where a mark is found to be
protectable or registerable even though, in the language of the
Lanham Act, it is “descriptive,” “primarily merely a surname,” or
34
“primarily geographic.”
The second scenario is where the
geographic or market scope of trademark rights are broadly
interpreted to include areas that are not obvious from the actual
use of a mark or from the description of use contained in a
35
trademark registration.
For instance, a company that uses its
trademark only in Northern California is said to have rights
throughout California, or a company that uses a mark on bicycles is
said to have the right to prohibit the use of the same mark on dolls.
The third set of cases are those in which the plaintiff’s trademark
rights are applied not only to prevent the use of the identical mark,
36
but also to prevent the use of a mark that is found to be “similar.”
Entrepreneurs and small-business owners rightly should be
expected to check their local phone book, the Internet, and the
trademark database of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office to determine whether another company is already using the
same mark on its goods and services. However, they cannot be
expected to understand and apply the intricate and highly factspecific analysis that is required when trademark law is extended
37
beyond its obvious contours.
In other words, while fledging
32. Id.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (a) through (e) (2000) (listing the types of marks
that cannot be registered) and § 1052 (f) (listing the types of marks that, although
not immediately registerable, can be registered upon proof of acquired
distinctiveness (otherwise known as “secondary meaning”)).
34. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (e)(1), (e)(2) and (e)(4) (2000).
35. See generally 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, ch. 24 (describing situations where
infringement is alleged with respect to the use of a mark on related but noncompetitive goods) and ch. 26 (explaining the territorial extent of trademark
rights.)
36. Id., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 7, ch. 24.
37. By “obvious contours” I mean the law of trademark that a small-business
person of reasonable intelligence, or even an attorney who does not specialize in
trademark law, might be able to glean from a reading of the actual text of the
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entrepreneurs and small-business owners can be expected to
understand that their use of “McDonald’s” for a hamburger
restaurant is not permissible under United States trademark law, it
is unrealistic to require Mr. McDonald to know that the opening of
his “McDonald’s Shoe Store” might violate both trademark and
38
trademark dilution principles.
While the courts in cases that apply trademark law broadly may
take solace in the fact that they are protecting the plaintiff’s
“property” or “proprietary rights” every time they interpret and
apply trademark law in a way that expands the scope of the
plaintiff’s rights, the courts effectively increase the barriers to entry.
But it is not just the monetary costs that should concern the courts
and policy makers. They should also be concerned that an
expansive application of trademark law will dampen the
entrepreneurial spirit by making the process of starting a new
business, including the seemingly simple task of selecting a name
and domain name, more difficult. One need only sit across the
table from an inventor, an artist, or an entrepreneur and discuss
their ideas and plans to understand what I mean. A lot of what
makes the United States economically strong is the entrepreneurial
spirit of its people—the drive to work hard, create, and innovate
and the ability to dream of a new and better future. For many
people, that dream is grounded in a desire to start their own
business.
By expressing my concerns about the plight of small business
in selecting a business name, I do not mean to suggest that courts
should always err on the side of the defendant in trademark cases.
As noted above, small businesses are also adversely affected by the
application of trademark law in a manner that does not recognize
their legitimate common law rights. Instead, I am suggesting that
courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office should
be particularly careful to appropriately define the scope of
trademark rights in cases where a plaintiff or trademark applicant
seeks to establish rights beyond the obvious boundaries of
trademark law. Specifically, when presented with a mark that is not

Lanham Act, particularly a reading of 15 U.S.C. § 1052.
38. It is also unrealistic to expect the small-business person to go through the
time, trouble, and expense of searching the trademark registration records of
foreign governments, even though the United States’ adherence to the priority
rules of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (see Article
4) suggests that they do so.
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inherently distinctive, they should be reticent to recognize broad
trademark rights.
Congress should also get involved to help rebalance trademark
law for the benefit of both consumers and small-business owners.
As it has been suggested elsewhere, Congress can begin by
repealing the rule of “incontestability” of trademarks or, at the very
least, by precluding the application of such rule to non-inherently
39
distinctive marks.
It might also consider doing away with the
principle that allows non-inherently distinctive marks to be
40
protected once they acquire secondary meaning.
In this way,
businesses would be required to take more care to select truly
distinctive marks and small businesses that did not wish to incur
such expense could more safely and easily pursue the strategy of
avoidance I describe above. If Congress is unwilling to prohibit the
registration of non-inherently distinctive marks altogether, it might
consider doing away with the presumption of validity that attaches
41
to the registration of such marks. By imposing the initial burden
of proof on the issue of the existence of a valid trademark on the
plaintiff, small businesses that are a party to a weak claim of
trademark infringement may be able to prevail more easily and
earlier.
CONCLUSION
In the quest to encourage innovation and creativity and ensure
that the industries of the new millennium succeed, it seems that the
scales of intellectual property law have gotten out of kilter. The
United States Congress, courts and many commentators are so
focused on the “investment” that individuals and companies make
to develop and market trademarks, to engage in research and
development, and to produce works of authorship that they seem
to have forgotten there are other interests to consider. Most
importantly, for a society that values free trade and touts the
benefits of a free market, they have forgotten that intellectual
39. Port, supra note 19 (arguing that the concept of incontestability that is
contained in the Lanham Act has altered the traditional scope of trademark
protection and should be repealed).
40. As noted by Thomas McCarthy, the practice of allowing trademark rights
in non-inherently distinctive marks to be acquired over time upon proof of
“secondary meaning” is a fairly new feature of United States trademark law. 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 7, § 16.34. If businesses survived without such a rule in the
past, presumably they can survive without such a rule in the future.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2000).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004

11

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 5 [2004], Art. 3
SANDEEN-FORMATTED

1716

7/20/2004 7:24:46 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:5

property is one of the biggest impediments to both. Moreover, for
a free market economy that touts the benefits of entrepreneurship
and laments the failure of small businesses, they appear not to
recognize that one of the largest constituencies to be adversely
affected by strong intellectual property rights is small business.
Given the big names that were involved in the four cases
before the Supreme Court in the new millennium—Wal-Mart,
Victoria’s Secret, Twentieth Century Fox—it is easy to forget about the
small-business person, but I don’t think the United States Supreme
Court has forgotten. The concerns that the Court expressed in its
recent trademark cases, as Professor Welkowitz so succinctly
describes, may mean that the Court sees a role for itself as a
defender of consumer and small-business interests. Since Congress
has yet to accept such a role, I am glad that someone understands
that there is more to trademark law than the “property rights”
banter of large intellectual property rights holders.
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